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Numerous past events have shown that natural and anthropogenic hazards have the potential to cause significant 
societal losses through damages to infrastructure systems and associated disruptions of societal functionalities. 
Examples hereof count the hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the USA, the attack on the Old Mostar bridge in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina during the Balkan war and the failure of the Morandi bridge in Italy. The degree to which such 
events impose consequences and impair or reduce societal service provisions is commonly assessed through the 
concept of resilience. Societal resilience may be significantly supported by safe, sustainable, and resilient 
infrastructure systems. 
Several studies have been undertaken by researchers with regards to the concept of resilience management to 
enhance decisions on the infrastructural systems. An indicator-based framework has been presented in reference 
(Turksezer, Limongelli, and Faber 2020) to provide a tool to assist the decision maker in service life management 
of infrastructure resilience. In principle, using this framework, the decision maker may estimate the resilience of the 
system through observable characteristics (resilience indicators) and assess the efficiency of different design or 
intervention measures. This paper aims to propose a number of metrics for the resilience indicators that can facilitate 
the practical implementation of the framework. 
Keywords: Resilience indicators, resilience management, decision analysis, information management
 
1. Introduction
Sustainable societal development critically 
depends on resilient and reliable infrastructure 
systems. Extreme events, whether natural or 
anthropogenic, may cause severe damages and 
lead to substantial reductions in infrastructure 
services. To manage infrastructure systems with 
respect to such events the concept of resilience 
has been introduced, see e.g. (Gardoni 2019) for a 
comprehensive overview and references to further 
literature. 
The resilience of a system depends on a 
number of factors, including the degree to which 
the system is able to i) observe and appreciate that 
a potential disturbance is emerging, ii) mobilize 
adequate and sufficient resources to respond and 
iii) adapt strategies for management to new 
information at any time when such is made 
available over the course of the service of the 
system. To be able to inform decisions for optimal 
strategic, operational and tactical resilience 
management in a timely manner it is necessary 
that the relevant information is observed and 
processed consistently and efficiently. Indicators 
of resilience are tools to transfer to decision 
makers information regarding observable 
characteristics of the system, that affect resilience,
in order to support and facilitate the decision-
making process. The present contribution is the 
first attempt of the authors to define such 
observable characteristics of resilience indicators 
that can be used for their quantification. These 
characteristics will be addressed as ‘sub-
indicators’. Following the framework proposed in 
(Turksezer, Limongelli, and Faber 2020) the 
bridge system is structured into three subsystems 
(i.e. physical, information and organizational), 
each of them described by four main indicators 
(i.e. resistance, ductility, redundancy and 
diversity). Herein the sub-indicators for each of 
the three sub-systems and each of the four 
indicators will be introduced.
In Section 2, we address resilience 
management as a decision problem inspired by 
the Joint Committee on Structural Safety (JCSS 
2008) risk-based approach. In Section 3 we 
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introduce the observable system characteristics 
(sub-indicators) and finally Section 4 provides 
suggestions for further research.
2. Resilience Management
Most often resilience management is referred as
the short-term ability of the system to recover 
from any disturbance event in a short time without 
any significant functionality loss. However, 
resilient system must be responsible not only from 
loss of functionality (or recovery) but also from 
the generation of the capacity which is crucial for 
the adaptation, efficient reorganization and 
recovery after disturbance events (Faber et al. 
2017). This capacity must be valid for lifetime 
management of the system.
Resilience management can be addressed as 
governance of the system based on the ranking of 
decision alternatives through the identification, 
organization and communication of optimal 
actions to be undertaken on the system 
constituents during the life cycle of the system. 
Observed and assessed information on the state of 
the system supports decision makers on optimal 
actions for design and interventions in three-time 
horizons, i.e. before, during and after a
disturbance event.
In any decision analysis for the management 
of systems, the first step is to identify the system. 
A systematic approach addressing infrastructure 
systems has been considered previously 
(Turksezer, Limongelli, and Faber 2020) with 
special focus on aspects relating to the resilience 
performances of the system.
Functionalities of critical infrastructure are 
clustered into three subsystems, i.e. physical,
information and organizational. Subsystems 
consist of one or more interdependent constituents 
and each subsystem is a constituent of the main 
system. The physical subsystem must enable the 
system to achieve its design objectives (e.g. 
transportation infrastructure provides 
transportation for individuals and goods) with an 
adequate level of safety and reliability (e.g. any 
structure provides load carrying capacity). The 
functionality of the information subsystem is to 
transform into human knowledge what can be 
observed in the real-world (i.e. evidence), and to 
enable the flow of information between 
stakeholders within the system, in support to 
decision making. The management of the entire 
system is ensured by the organizational 
subsystem. The three subsystems are interrelated 
and connected through the flow of information 
provided by the information subsystem. 
2.1. Resilience indicators
Resilience indicators are tools which are used to 
transmit specific information to the decision 
makers on any observable or measurable 
characteristic of the system or its constituents (i.e. 
subsystems). For each of the three subsystems 
(physical, information and organizational) 
defined in (Turksezer, Limongelli, and Faber 
2020), seven resilience indicators were defined to
describe the sub-system characteristics that 
describe resilience. and four of them are ‘main’ 
indicators (resistance, diversity, ductility and 
redundancy) which affect the other system 
characteristics more frequently used to define risk 
and functionality.
Fig. 1 Indicators at subsystem levels.
Figure 1 illustrates subsystem level indicators 
and their connections with a change with respect 
to the description given in the previous study. 
Here diversity contributes to both vulnerability 
and robustness. This is considered more 
consistent with the meaning of diversity indicator 
that describes the ability of the system to decrease 
the causes of failures (of different constituents).
In Section 3 the system characteristics that 
contribute to each of the four main indicators will 
be listed and discussed. 
In Figure 1, 4 main indicators are clustered
into two groups that describe the two system 
capacities overcome the disturbance event: 
absorptive and adaptive capacities. Both 
capacities are considered in different time scales 
(i.e. building the capacity in the before phase, 
employing it in the during event phase, adjusting 
new capacity in the after-event phase). Absorptive 
Proceedings of the 30th European Safety and Reliability Conference and
the 15th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference
capacity is the capability of the system (or its 
constituents) to absorb adverse impacts while 
adaptive capacity is the capability to adjust to
overcome changing conditions in the system.
Adaptive system can change in response to 
adverse impacts if absorptive capacity has been 
exceeded (Francis and Bekera 2014).
Figure 2 indicates, with reference to one of the 
system characteristics that affects resilience (that 
is resistance), the connection between the 
indicator and the decisions (red squares) made by 
the decision maker. These decisions are relevant 
to both monitoring of the indicator and adaptation 
of the system needed to manage the system 
resilience. The costs of the actions are indicated 
as well in the figure.
Fig. 1 Indicators as decision support.
2.2. The three time-horizons of resilience 
management
The general framework for resilience 
management presented in reference (Turksezer, 
Limongelli, and Faber 2020) did not address the 
time horizon and phases of resilience 
management. Inspired by the approach proposed 
in (JCSS 2008) we consider resilience 
management as a process structured into three 
phases (before, during and after a disturbance 
event).
There are three event phases defined in (JCSS 
2008) and described here as:
i. The ‘before’ event phase starts from the 
day the system is commenced and ends 
when a disturbance event is appreciated.
ii. The ‘during’ event phase starts at the end 
of the before phase and ends at the end 
of the recovery, when the system starts 
to provide all services at the intended 
level.
iii. The ‘after’ event phase starts from the 
end of the during phase and lasts until a 
new event occurs. This phase coincides 
with the ‘before’ phase of the subsequent 
disturbance event. However, decisions in 
the after-event phase may account for 
any information and knowledge gained 
from the past disturbance events.
The definition of these three phases is aimed to 
describe a process for resilience management 
where information is used to support decisions. 
However, the transition between the ‘before’ and 
the ‘during' phases is affected by a high level of 
uncertainty that depends on our knowledge about 
the disturbance event and on the information, that 
can be collected on the system and appreciated by 
stakeholders. 
For example, the occurrence of a seismic 
shock is usually attributed to a sudden release of 
accumulated strain energy. According to the 
previous definition, the ‘before’ phase starts when 
the deformation of the earth crust begins, which 
means immediately after the occurrence of the 
previous seismic event and can last several years. 
However, usually this information is not 
available, and we tend to say that the ‘before’ 
phase ends when the first seismic shock happens. 
The physics behind a volcanic eruption and our 
knowledge about it is similar to that of an 
earthquake. Yet, a volcanic eruption is usually 
preceded by a modest seismic activity which 
provides an alert about the imminent disturbance 
event. Similarly, for the case of a seismic event 
there are phenomena, micro seismic shocks, that 
can be used to infer the occurrence of an 
earthquake or measures, such as the arrival of a 
faster seismic waves (P waves) that enable to 
profile the earthquake thereby supporting alert 
systems. The main difference between the two 
types of disturbance events (earthquakes and 
volcanic eruption) is the time available between 
the moment we acquire the information and the 
moment the disturbance event occurs.
Another example is related to the disturbance 
event caused by corrosion. This phenomenon 
develops over a relatively long period of time 
until the first crack forms and this can happen 
after some years from the start of corrosion. The 
difference with respect to the previous two events 
is that, in this case, there are tools to acquire 
information about the development of the 
phenomenon and this facilitates interventions.
The previous examples show that duration of 
the three phases depends on the characteristics of 
the disturbance event that affect the moment when
information about its development become 
available to the decision maker.
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There are four types of disturbance events 
defined by (Faber, 2019) and exemplified by 
(Nielsen et al. 2019) for information channels;
1) The rare ones with large scale and high 
consequences, e.g. geohazards 
(earthquake, flood, etc.) and technical 
failures of technological information 
carriers within systems (power plants, 
wind turbine farms, etc.). These events 
build up for some decades, generate 
sudden losses and recovery may take 
some years.
2) Events that are more frequent in time 
with relatively small consequences that 
are commonly overseen and collectively 
ignored. Over adequate scales in time 
and space, they can lead to devastating 
consequences and their cumulative 
effects may trigger catastrophic 
consequences. Emissions to the 
environment, inadequate regulation and 
human errors as well as delayed 
information transfer due to 
organizational inadequacy and small 
biases in information management can 
be given as examples to this hazard type. 
These events may have a short ‘before’
phase but a long ‘during’ phase if they 
lead to Type 3 hazards.
3) Very rare, unpredictable, occurring over 
large extents in time and space and for 
which no knowledge is available. 
Examples are great volcanic eruptions, 
global climate change, satellite and 
electric communication losses due to 
solar storms, etc. The ‘before’ event 
phase may be protracted as well as the 
‘during’ event phase, in case of extensive 
losses.
4) Disturbance events triggered by 
manipulated or neglected information as 
well as censored and erroneous 
observations. This kind of hazard can 
increase the extent of the Type 1-2-3
disturbance events. The ‘before’ event 
phase extends due to the lack of 
information (or neglecting) and more 
severe losses are experienced. Therefore, 
the duration of ‘during’ event phase 
takes longer than Type 1-2-3 disturbance 
events. 
Decision making in each phase is supported by 
the information provided by the indicators. In 
each of the three phases the same indicators 
describe the system characteristics but the
information on the system characteristics differs
(e.g. resistance: design load capacity in the before 
event phase and residual load capacity in the 
during event phase, due to the demand generated 
by the exposure).
3. Metrics for the Quantification of Resilience 
Indicators
In this section for the each four main resilience 
indicators, recalled in Section 2.1., a list of 
observable system characteristics (sub-indicators) 
is given for each subsystem and for before and 
after event phases described in Section 2.2. The 
sub-indicators of the ‘after’ event phase coincide 
with those of the ‘before’ phase but they also 
contain the ‘lesson learnt’ that are changed,
updated, or restored by utilizing the information 
collected in the other event phases.
The sub-indicators are proxy attributes (used 
when it is difficult to identify the value of an 
indicator directly) to measure the level of the
related indicator. 
The definition of the sub-indicators is meant 
to provide metrics for the quantification of 
resilience in the future developments of this 
research. 
Resilience is an inter-disciplinary and inter-
sectoral topic on which a vast body of literature 
exists, and many definitions of indicator metrics 
have been proposed. A comprehensive literature 
review was performed in the Web of Science 
database on engineering, community, and system 
resilience. The indicators and metrics proposed in 
literature are generally defined for the single sub-
system (e.g. physical, information, 
organizational, etc.) or separately for each single 
event phase, with a clear prevalence of metrics 
defined for the recovery phase. At our best 
knowledge the definition of resilience metrics at
subsystem level, for different event phases has not 
been proposed previously.
The question to which Table 1 attempts to answer 
is the following: ‘Which information can be 
observed on a specific subsystem (for bridges)
and on that subsystem’s characteristics?’.
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Table 1 Definition and sub-indicators of four subsystem level indicators in before and during event phases.









- Design characteristics (target design 
reliability, structural type and scheme, 
geometry, material characteristics, demand 
at the time of the design, available 
standards/codes)
- Design load capacity
- Traffic capacity of the link/network 
- Material durability
- Durability of network
Condition
- Age of the structure 
- Degradation of transportation network
- Remaining lifetime
- Condition/status of a constituent 
- Increased capacity of a structural 
constituent by protective measures
- Increased capacity of a structural 
constituent by periodic maintenance or 
repair
- Survival to extreme loads in the past
- Stability/instability of the 
structure/network
- Number of failed/damaged 
constituents on structure/in network (i.e. 
extent of damage)
- Number of undamaged constituents (at 
structural and network level)
- Number of repaired constituents
- Residual capacity of the structure / of 
the network





- Number of data collection tools
- Load carrying capacity of technological 
constituents
- Design strength of technological 
constituents
- Security level of the network (against 
specific extreme events, e.g. cyber-attacks,
solar storms, etc)
- Durability of constituents
- Demand at the time of the design
. Technological development level at the 
time of the design
Condition
- Age of technological devices
-Degradation of information network
-Condition/status of constituents
-Increased capacity by protective measures 
on technological constituents 
- Stability of the network
- Survival to extreme events in the past
- Number of failed/damaged 
constituents (i.e. extent of damage)
- Number of undamaged constituents
-Decrease in the amount of information 
and in the information flow
- Number of repaired constituents
-Capacity after recovery in 
constituents/network 
- Residual capacity of technological 
constituents/network
- Amount of increased information on 
the system
- Amount of lost knowledge of people 
on construction techniques, 
craftsmanship and building technology




- Capacity of governance (i.e. health status,
age, educational level, culture)
- Amount of financial resources (i.e. 
wealth generation, capitals/investments)
- Maturity of organizational levels
- Durability of all resources
- Capacity of community (i.e. age, gender, 
race, class, expertise)
- The quality of governance (i.e. 
leadership, responsibilities of hierarchal
levels)
- Security of individuals (life safety)
Condition
- Degradation of physical resources
- Degradation of financial resources (i.e. 
devaluation)
- Amount of lost human, physical and 
financial resources (i.e. extent of 
damage)
- Amount of undamaged resources
- Residual capacity of human resources 
(e.g. lower performance, health 
problems)
- Amount of restored/recovered 
resources
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- Condition of all resources and 
organizational levels
- Increased capacity of human by 
formalized education and training in the 
relevant topic 
- Presence of social cohesion in 
community
- Increased capacity and strength of 
physical resources by scientific and 
technological developments
- Stability of the network
Ductility: 
The ability 








after one or 







- Deformation capacity of material and 
constituents
- Presence of interdependency in the 
network
- Use of undesired network links (e.g. 
using the roadway which is 100km longer 
than a bridge connection)
- Maximum deformation of materials at 
failure
- Presence of structural constituents with 
brittle behaviour
- Residual ductility





- Deformation capacity of technological 
constituents
- Presence of interdependency between 
technological constituents
- Use of undesired technological 
constituents 
- Continuous access to information 
(including human knowledge)
- Presence of technological constituents 
with brittle behaviour 
- Amount of delay in information flow 





- Undesired use of human resources for 
replacement (e.g. calling retired personnel 
to the duty or using people who have done 
military service as first responders)
- Undesired use of financial resources for
replacement (e.g. presence of bank loan,
use the income of another infrastructure)
- Perseverance of human resources 
- Continuity of leadership
- Presence of interdependency inside 
hierarchical levels
- Presence of interdependent financial 
resources
- Coordination level in system, e.g. 
participation of individuals to response, 
social movements, staff engagement and 
involvement
- Presence of physical resources (i.e. 
human and materials) with brittle 
behaviour 
- Amount of time loss (for each actor)
- Elapsed time since the first constituent 
loss 
- Amount of sufficed (or insufficient) 
budget (including external resources, 
e.g. fund raising)
Redundancy
: The ability 














- Number of alternative structural 
constituents/materials
- Number of alternative constituents in 
network (e.g. parallel bridges, or a bridge 
and seaway)
- Amount of utilized alternative 
constituents (in structure or network)
- Amount of utilized alternative 
materials 





- Network connectivity (to provide 
information flow)
Resourcefulness
- Number of alternative information 
acquisition tools
- Number of alternative channels to 
support information flow between 
subsystems
- Number of backup systems
- Amount of knowledge of people 
living/working in the same place
- Number of used alternative 
communication channels
- Number of lost and recovered 
alternative constituents
- Number of alternative scenarios and 
plans put into practice (e.g. alternative 
emergency management scenarios, 
communication plans, etc.)




- Connectivity between organizational 
levels (interoperability)
Resourcefulness
- Used alternative human resources 
(number of people/teams) for the same 
duty
- Amount of distributed resources (in 
terms of money) 
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- Number/presence of alternative 
sites/areas for emergency management 
service
- Number/presence of alternative models of 
obtaining supplies/resources
- Number of alternative solutions for 
emergency
- Number/presence of human resources 
inside teams and management levels
- Presence of help of other communities


















-Presence of different protective measures 
(against different disturbance events)
-Number of different transport means in 
the same network 
-Presence of different constituents in the 
network (e.g. different connectivity and 
routes)
- Presence of different protection measures
Substitutability
- Flexibility of material and constituent 
selection
- Number of used different constituents 
(in structural and network level)
- Number of different materials used to 
replace/rehabilitate constituents (in 
structural and network level)
- Number of constituents that cannot be 
recovered due to their irreplaceable 




-Presence of different human knowledge 
and memories
-Variety of plans and scenarios for 
different disturbance events
-Presence of different technological 
constituents (e.g. different backup systems, 
information transferring channels and 
acquisition tools, communication channels 
etc.)
-Presence of different control and 
monitoring systems
- Presence of different hardware and 
software constituents 
- Presence of different protection measures
Substitutability
- Flexibility of material and constituent 
selection
- Presence of different alternative storage 
for memories and legacy data
- Amount of proxy information 
- Used different scenarios, plans
- Used different technological 
constituents 
- Availability of separate backup on site 
to not have interruption of information 
flow
- Procuration of timely and relevant 
information by different channels
- Lost and/or recovered different 
technological constituents
- Variety of information that may affect 
decision making (e.g. tsunami 
probability in case of earthquake)
- Amount of different knowledge 
(expertise) included in the information 
flow (between decision makers)
- Used different information storage 
(e.g. use of human knowledge and 





-Number of different fund allocation
-Different levels of management (variety 
of knowledge)
-Presence of different training and 
education activities for different 
disturbance events
-Amount of different physical resources 
(e.g. technical equipment, vehicles etc.)
-Number of different personnel and 
institutions
- Variety of demographic characteristics 
(i.e. level of education, occupation,
ancestral)
Substitutability
- Flexibility of resources to take each 
other’s roles
-Amount of different resources (e.g. 
stockpile) for customers/ users
- Availability of different financial 
resources (from different sources)
- Amount of lost and recovered different 
resources 
- Amount of different resources used in 
the emergency
- Participation of different levels (e.g. 
national, village, neighbour level) to 
recovery activities
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- Presence of self-organization in different 
levels
In the table each cell contains a metric that 
describes a specific system characteristic. The 
column of ‘before’ event phase describes 
characteristics designed, built, or kept functional 
before any disturbance event while the column of 
‘during’ event phase relates to response, loss and 
recovery states of the specific subsystem. 
A series of sub-indicators are listed in Table 1.
It is not possible to collect information on each 
characteristic. Therefore, some sub-indicators are 
proposed to replace another if information is not 
available (e.g. number of undamaged constituents 
and number of repaired constituents).
Table 1 shows the decision maker where and 
which information to look for before making a 
decision in different time horizons: information 
about the past events enables decision maker to 
analyse the management past critically.
In the during event phase, some terms may 
look similar with before event phase indicators 
(e.g. load capacity), but the information 
transferred to decision maker is different (e.g. 
design load capacity in the before event phase and 
residual load capacity in the during event phase).
Herein, comprehensive, and generic bridge 
sub-indicators are described that can be adapted 
for different infrastructure systems.
4. Conclusion
In this paper the preliminary results of an 
investigation aimed to formulate resilience 
indicators, observable system characteristics (i.e. 
sub-indicators) and metrics for resilience 
management of bridge systems are presented. In 
the previous paper, the authors proposed a 
resilience management framework where the 
bridge system is represented as the integration of 
three subsystems (i.e. physical, information and 
organizational) providing different
functionalities. Indicators and relevant metrics are 
defined in this paper to describe the 
characteristics of each subsystem and for three 
time horizons (before, during and after) that are 
assumed to characterize a disturbance event.
A comprehensive literature review has been 
carried out in several sectors and disciplines in 
order to identify commonalities and discrepancies 
between the existing metrics and consistently 
integrate them in the resilience management 
framework.
Apparently, many existing metrics and 
indicators with different names address similar or
identical system characteristics and can be thus 
clustered under common definitions. In this 
perspective the indicators proposed in our 
framework constitute a promising starting point.
In the future research stages, this approach 
will be applied to all resilience indicators
proposed in the previous paper. Thence a decision 
support tool in the context of resilience informed 
decision making will be formed to support asset 
managers.
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